Automatic Co2 Over Switch
Mon, 26 Apr 2010 08:25:55 +0000

Tippmann A5 E-Grip w/ Selector Switch Paintball Marker
$279
Player's View:The Tippmann A-5 paintball gun is one of Tippmann's highest selling guns. You can literally see these in every store within a 5 mile radius and it's for a reason. The Tippmann A-5 is a mid-level paintball gun built with the same quality and durability you can expect from the Tippmann name. The coolest feature on the A-5 is hands down the built in Cyclone feed system. These can feed 20 balls per second and do not take any batteries making it so there's never that need to upgrade to an expensive loader. This gun is setup great for any level of player especially the avid woodsballer right out of the box you have a system that can keep up with just about any high end woodsball style gun on the market. The A-5 is setup so you can easily disassemble the whole bolt system. The A-5 is ready to rock out of the box but in case you are inclined to take your setup 1 level higher the A-5 is very easily upgradable in every aspect. For the price this gun is a solid investment in any serious paintballer's budget.The black Tippmann A-5 Marker with E-Grip & Selector Switch is all about speed. Its patented Cyclone Feed System links the feeder sprocket to the air system giving it the power to unleash a fury of balls as fast as you can fire them. It also features electronics with five firing modes (semi-auto auto-response full auto 3-shot bursts turbo) for rapid variable firing up to 17 balls per second. The Tippmann A-5 Marker with E-Grip combines technology accuracy and durability and can also be completely stripped and reassembled in the field in 60 seconds - without tools.With its all-aluminum die cast receiver and extra-sturdy black finish the Tippmann A-5 Marker with E-Grip is one of the toughest markers available. Other features include a shock-absorbing end cap for reduced wear and recoil; front-cocking knob which allows for a fully enclosed receiver; and a 200-round wide-mouth hopper. In addition it can be upgraded with many different accessories including but not limited to a Flatline Barrel System Sniper barrels collapsible stock double trigger low pressure kit and expansion chamber kit. It’s fully-compatible for CO2 compressed air or nitrogen and is completely customizable for enhanced performance.Features:Electronics with 5 modes for rapid variable firing Adjustable Front Grip Micro Honed Barrel Extra Light Trigger Pull Built-In Vertical Tank Adapter MP5 Style Rear Sight Removable Grip Frame Inline Tank Adapter Includes A-5 HopperSpecs: Caliber: .68 SEMI AutomaticMagazine Capacity: 150+CO2 Capacity: 250+ shots per (standard) 9 oz. cylinderCycle Rate:15+BPSStandard Barrel Length:8.5 Length: 20 (with Standard Barrel & no tank)Weight: 3.5 lbs (without tank)Effective Range: 150+ ft
The fundamental problems with “Cap and Trade” are NOT addressed by auctioning (as opposed to free allocation or) quota, as often suggested by many observers, not just some who have added their comments to this column.
“Cap and trade” is a fancy name for good old-fashioned quota-based supply management.
Let’s walk through the auction proposal. Let’s say that our governments agree to cover all energy commodities with a limited and declining supply of quota (quota is called “allowances” in emission markets) and that the entire quota supply will be auctioned, annually. No power plant, refinery, cement plant, aluminum smelter, etc., can operate without quota. What prudent investor will build a new smelter in the US–even if it discharges GHGs at 50% the rate of existing smelters–given that all the initial investor’s competitors have to do is outbid the owner at one annual quota auction to completely obliterate that investor’s return? Without some guaranteed access to quota, the US does not get the new investment in less GHG-intensive plants. But if you guarantee quota to not-yet investors in new plants and make existing investors in existing plants buy quota to cover 100% of their GHGs, you have simply taken assets from existing owners, to redistribute wealth from them to new investors. Can you spell “exporpriation”?
Or imagine the first US national GHG quota auction was held last Friday. Imagine that the City of Chicago woke up this moring to find that their power bills now have to go up to cover the cost of “leasing” GHG quota from China’s sovereign wealth fund, because the city’s electricity suppliers were outbid by the offshore bidder. In any unrestricted 100% quota auction, the value of quota is the price competitors put on market share. And prudent quota holders never “sell” any surplus they can acquire. They hoard quota/allowances and effectively “lease” out their supply through swap agreements. (This kind of activity dominates the EU CO2 market and did dominate the US SO2 allowance market from 1995 through 2001).
Inevitably, the 100% auction promoters will have to move on to devise all sorts of complex strategies to restrict participation in and the amount of quota that any entity can buy at the auction. After a while, all of the theoretical efficiency benefits of 100% auction disappear. If you want to see how that works out, take a look at how the dairy quota regimes in Canada or the Netherlands work (100% of dairy quota has been annually auctioned for many years in these markets).
When you impose a quota regime on a market that had de facto rights to engage in the restricted activity before the quota-holding obligation was imposed, the results arising from the imposition of a quota regime are always the same–even with 100% auction. That is increased concentration of market power in the hands of the largest, wealthiest market participants–which entities are not necessarily the most innovative. Long-term innovation and productivity imporvement rates always slow down as a direct result of the imposition of a quota regime on an existing market.
These problems derive directly from the government decision to impose a quota regime on the market . We shouldn’t be trying to fix the quota regime. We should be talking about how to enforce new product standards without quota.
— Aldyen Donnelly


